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Decisions Made During Program Execution 
as a Root Cause of Nunn-McCurdy Breaches 
 
The Evidence from Root Cause Analyses done by  
RAND and IDA for PARCA 
May 16-17 
David L. McNicol 
Background: Nunn-McCurdy Act and the Weapon 
Systems Acquisition Reform Act 
• The topic of this brief cannot be stated clearly without first noting aspects 
of the Nunn-McCurdy Act (1983) and the Weapon Systems Acquisition 
Reform Act (WSARA—2009). 
• The Nunn-McCurdy Act establishes limits on cost growth, which, if 
exceeded, require the Secretary of Defense to at least notify the Congress 
and—if the growth exceeds a “critical” limit—to recertify the program. 
• The Nunn-McCurdy Act defines two measures of cost growth: 
– Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC): the per unit produced cost of 
developing and procuring the program. 
– Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC): the program’s procurement 
cost per unit produced. 
• The Nunn-McCurdy Act requires measuring cost growth against each of 
two not necessarily distinct baselines: 
– The original baseline, usually that established at Milestone B; and 
– The current baseline, if the program has been rebaselined. 
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Nunn-McCurdy Act Thresholds 
Original Baseline Current Baseline 
     PAUC 
               Significant ≥30% ≥15% 
               Critical ≥50% ≥25% 
     APUC 
               Significant ≥30% ≥15% 
               Critical ≥50% ≥25% 
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WSARA (2009) 
• WSARA, among several other things: 
– Establishes the Office of Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses 
(PARCA); 
– Requires the Director of PARCA to perform a “root cause analysis” (RCA) of all 
major acquisition programs that experience a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach. 
• WSARA also lists eight “root causes” for use in the required root 
cause analyses; in abbreviated form these are: 
1. Unrealistic performance expectations 
2. Unrealistic baseline estimates for cost and schedule 
3. Immature technologies or excessive manufacturing or integration risk 
4. Unanticipated design, engineering, manufacturing, or technology integration 
issues arising during program performance 
5. Changes in procurement quantities 
6. Inadequate program funding or funding instability 
7. Poor performance by government or contractor personnel responsible for 
program management 
8. Other 
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Key Elements of PARCA Guidance for RCAs 
• PARCA has informally specified a top level taxonomy of cost 
growth for use in RCAs: 
– Inception: Sources of cost growth inherent in the relevant Acquisition 
Program Baseline (APB).  
– Execution: Cost growth that results from decisions made post-APB. 
• Endogenous: Although the proximate cause of the growth is a decision 
made after the APB is issued (e.g., a program stretch), the decision is 
driven by some flawed aspect of the APB (e.g., an unrealistic procurement 
cost estimate). 
• Exogenous: A decision is made for reasons largely or entirely unrelated to 
problems with the program. 
• PARCA’s informal guidance to analysts also distinguishes: 
– Proximate causes of cost growth—aka the “accident scene 
investigation”; and 
– The analysis connecting specific proximate causes to root causes. 
18 May 2012 5 
Agenda 
• Remote Minehunting System 
• Global Hawk 
• ChemDemil ACWA 
• F-35 
• Summary of IDA Conclusions 
18 May 2012 6 
18 May 2012 7 
Remote Minehunting System (RMS) 
Bailey, John W., Alexander O. Gallo, Tzee-Nan Lo, Caolionn L. O’Connell,  
Thomas P. Frazier (Project Leader), and Patricia F. Bronson (Task Leader).  
“Remote Minehunting System: Root Cause Analysis.” IDA Paper P-4600. 
Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, June 2010. 
RMS 1: Introduction 
• RMS was initially an Acquisition Category (ACAT) II program. In 
1999, it was granted authority to begin Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (EMD). 
• RMS received authority to enter full rate production in 2005.   
• By the following year, RMS funding had increased to the point 
that it was designated an ACAT IC program—that is, a Major 
Defense Acquisition Program for which the Service Acquisition 
Executive is the Milestone Decision Authority.  
• In June of 2007, RMS was decertified for Operational Test. 
• The Congress was notified of critical Nunn-McCurdy breaches 
for both RMS’s PAUC and APUC in Dec. 2009. 
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RMS 2: Proximate Causes of Growth in RMS PAUC over 
the 2006 Acquisition Program Baseline* 
Inception % 
Unrealistic unit cost estimation  14 
Execution 
Endogenous to RMS     
    - Reliability Growth Program  18 
     - Five year production Gap    4 
     - Reduced Production Rate    8 
Exogenous—Quantity reduction  35 
Not Classified    6 
Total  85 
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RMS 3: Comments on the Proximate Causes 
     (35%) The planned procurement quantity was reduced by just 
over 50% because the Navy decided to use a more advanced 
system for the anti-submarine warfare mission module of the 
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). The IDA study found that reliability 
issues were not among the factors behind this decision. 
     (14%) The 2006 APB did not use the then available data on 
two prior production lots. 
     (22%) Reliability issues (described on the next chart) led to a 
five-year gap in production and the adoption of a reliability 
growth program. 
     (8%)  The Navy decided to stretch the (reduced) planned 
production. The decision to reduce the planned buy did not 
force this decision, so it is scored here as an Endogenous 
Execution decision, reflecting cost growth. 





RMS 4: Reliability Issues and Government 
Oversight 
• IDA identifies “three significant ways” in which the “Navy failed to follow 
appropriate acquisition policies and procedures” ( Bailey et al    p. 9) 
1. “inadequate contract planning, due to schedule pressures and personnel 
shortages” 
2. Award of the first Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) contract “based on build 
to print terms…without adequately reviewing the contractor drawings” 
3. “the immature design resulted in early development and production units 
falling short of the system’s performance thresholds for availability and 
reliability during testing.” 
• The study directly connects the third of these (but not the first two) to 
cost growth; in particular, the costs of the five-year production slip and 
the reliability growth program. 
• The pivotal fact noted by the study in this connection is that the first 
three LRIP lots were put on contract even after testing had revealed 
reliability issues and reliability improvement on continuing testing was 
“marginal at best.” 
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RMS 5: RMS PAUC Growth in WSARA Root Cause 
Categories 
#2 Unrealistic baseline estimate for cost or schedule.  14% 
#7 Poor performance by government or contractor personnel 
responsible for program management 
 22% 
#5 Endogenous stretch in (reduced) planned procurement   8% 
#5 Exogenous changes in total procurement quantities  35% 
Not tracked to a WSARA root cause  6% 
                            Total change from Acquisition Program Baseline  85% 
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“The analysis also examined the root causes behind the three proximate causes.  Two 
root causes are directly related to their proximate causes (procurement reduction and  
a baseline cost error). The decision to reduce the procurement quantities appears to  
be exogenous to the program and unrelated to reliability issues.  The baseline cost  
estimate was unrealistic, since the original estimates did not include some cost data. 
The final root cause—failure of government oversight—manifested itself in the 
reliability issues.”  Bailey et al., S-1 and S-2. 
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Global Hawk 
Fox, Jeffrey N., Paul M. Kodzwa, David M. Tate (Project Leader), and Patricia F. Bronson 
(Task Leader). “Global Hawk: Root Cause Analysis of Projected Unit Cost Growth.” 
IDA Paper P-4668. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, May 2011. 
Global Hawk 1: Introduction 
• Global Hawk began in 1995 as an Advanced Concepts Technical 
Demonstration project of the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency. 
• In 2001, Global Hawk was designated as an MDAP and authorized to 
begin EMD and Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP). 
• Global Hawk experienced significant Nunn-McCurdy breaches in 2004 
and 2005 and critical breaches for both PAUC and APUC in 2006. 
• A CAPE-CA fast turnaround estimate in 2010 indicated that Global Hawk 
costs had increased to near the level of critical breach. 
• PARCA was tasked by the USD(AT&L) to undertake an RCA in anticipation 
of the declaration of a Nunn-McCurdy breach, and PARCA tasked the 
supporting IDA analysis.  
• A critical Nunn-McCurdy breach was declared in April 2011.  The 
program was certified by USD(AT&L) in June 2011. 
• One main variant of Global Hawk (the Block 30) was cancelled in the 
President’s Budget submitted to the Congress in January 2012. 
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Global Hawk 2: Proximate Causes of Growth of 
APUC from the 2007 Baseline 
Inception % 
Increased cost for content included in the 2007 Baseline  14.1 
Stretch of test schedule*  7.4 
Execution—Exogenous 
Changes in the mix of aircraft purchased  6.7 
More initial spares because of increased aircraft utilization  7.2 
Other—Not Classified 
Engineering Change Orders above contractor historical average  2.0 
Known program content not included in 2007 cost estimate  9.7 
Total  47.1 
18 May 2012 15 * Includes $75M for correction of problems with Diminished Manufacturing Sources. 
What is the appropriate classification for known content not included in the 




Global Hawk 3: Evolutionary Acquisition and 
Uncosted Content in the 2007 Baseline 
• Global Hawk was directed to pursue an evolutionary acquisition strategy when, 
in 2001, it was designated an MDAP. 
• In 2002, the program office and the contractor established six spirals, each to 
carry a common sensor/SIGINT package. 
• Under the rules then prevailing: 
– Requirements for each spiral were to be fully specified and costed, but 
– The question of what requirements were to eventually be met (by as-yet-
unspecified spirals) could be left open and, hence, not costed.  
• By 2006, the program had become a concurrent development of four distinct 
platform/sensor variants (Blocks 10, 20, 30, & 40). 
• Under the 2006 revision of the Capabilities Development Document (CDD), the 
four variants would provide all of the capabilities required. 
• The 2006 CDD stated future dates by which various capabilities were to be 
provided. The costing of the 2007 APB excluded some known requirements for 
one or more of the variants. 
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The uncosted content appears to be a legacy of Global Hawk’s origin as an 
evolutionary acquisition. 
Global Hawk 4: APUC Growth from 2007 Baseline 
in WSARA Root Cause Categories 
#2 Unrealistic 2007 baseline estimate for cost or schedule  21.5% 
#5 Exogenous: Changes in mix  6.7% 
#8 Exogenous: Other—increased aircraft utilization requires more 
initial spares 
 7.2% 
#7 Poor performance by government or contractor personnel 
responsible for program management 
 9.7% 
Not tracked to a WSARA root cause category  2.0% 
                                           Total APUC change from 2007 Baseline  47.1% 
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• The two exogenous execution changes would have pushed the program into 
a critical breach, but these are indications of program success, not failure. 
• The known content not included in the cost estimate of the revised (2007) 
baseline is not cost growth, as it represents costs of capabilities specified in 
the 2006 CDD. 
• To this extent, the Global Hawk’s 2011 critical Nunn-McCurdy breach is a self-
inflicted wound. 
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Chemical Demilitarization—Assembled Chemical  
Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) 
O’Connell, Caolionn L. (Project Leader), Ji S. Byun, and Patricia Bronson (Task 
Leader). “Chemical Demilitarization—Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives 
(ACWA) Root Cause Analysis.” IDA Paper P-4677. Alexandria, VA: Institute for 
Defense Analyses, July 2011. 
ChemDemil ACWA 1: Introduction 
• ChemDemil ACWA began in 1996.  It was designated an MDAP 
in 2003, and an APB for the program was established at that 
time. 
 
• ACWA experienced a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach in 2006.  
A new APB for the program was established in April 2007. 
 
• The Congress was notified of a second critical Nunn-McCurdy 
breach for ACWA in December 2010. 
 
• The IDA RCA examines the growth in ACWA cost from the 
2007 revision of the APB to the 2011 Program Office Estimate. 
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ACWA 2: Proximate Causes of PAUC Growth from the 2007 
APB to the 2011 Program Office Estimate (percent)* 
Inception % 
Increased construction costs  18.0 
Increased closure costs  3.9 
Execution 
Exogenous: More realistic estimate of the labor required for 24/7 
systematization and operations 
 3.1 
Exogenous: Increased use of Explosive Destruction Technology (EDT)  5.0 
At least partly exogenous: Other scope and content changes  2.1 
Not Classified      
Larger allowance for risk  4.7 
Other—residual  4.8 
Total  41.6 





ACWA 3: Comments on the Causes of PAUC Growth 
Information available and context indicate that these two items are 
increases in the estimated cost of content in the 2007 APB.  Two 
qualifications are required: 
– Some of the increases may be for content beyond that in the 2007 baseline, 
and 
– These increases may have been inflated by a combination of schedule 
pressures and the contract structure. 
The first two of these items (24/7 staffing and EDT) were directed changes 
in the program, apparently prompted by concerns with meeting U.S. 
treaty commitments.  The “Other scope and content changes” were at 
least partially also exogenous. 
The IDA report shows that the contract structure did not incentivize either 
the government or the contractors to control and realistically estimate 
and report life cycle costs. The treaty-driven purpose of the program and 
its connections to domestic concerns also gave ACWA a degree of 
insulation from budgetary pressures. IDA was not able to estimate the 
magnitude of this effect, however. 




ACWA 4: IDA Assignment of Causes of PAUC 
Growth to WSARA Root Cause Categories 
#2 Unrealistic baseline estimate for cost or schedule        22% + 
#8 Exogenous changes in program content        10% - 
#8 Poorly structured incentives on life cycle cost control and 
reporting 
         ? 
Not tracked to a WSARA Category       9.5% 
                                                       Total change from 2007 Baseline     41.6%* 
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“IDA’s analysis causes traced this cost growth to three root causes—unrealistic 
[baseline] cost estimate, contract structure, and a larger allowance for risk. The risk  
categorization contains elements of both the unrealistic cost estimate and  
the contract structure. Due to the interconnectedness of the major causes for cost 
growth, the cost growth cannot be easily apportioned into the three categories.” 
O’Connell et al., 21. 
* Excludes growth in MILCON. 
18 May 2012 23 
F-35 
Arnold, Scot, Ji S. Byun, Harley Cloud, Alexander O. Gallo, Matthew W. Gonwa, 
Bruce R. Harmon, Prashant R. Patel, Colin D. Sullivan, John Hiller (Project 
Leader), and Patricia Bronson (Task Leader). “WSARA 2009: Joint Strike Fighter 
Root Causes Analysis.” IDA Paper P-4612. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense 
Analyses, June 2010. 
F-35 1: Introduction 
• A critical Nunn-McCurdy breach was declared in FY09 for the 
F-35. PAUC was then 57% above the original baseline. 
• RAND and IDA both did an RCA of the F-35. 
• Should this review attempt a synthesis of the two studies? 
– The studies take complementary approaches; 
– They both make several of the same points; 
– The two studies appear to share an underlying conception of the 
problems.  
• An attempt at a synthesis would not be constructive in this 
context, however, because neither study provides an estimate 
of the cost growth caused by post-MS B decisions. 
18 May 2012 24 
What kept these studies from identification and quantitative  
assessments of the major Execution Phase root causes? 
F-35 2: Proximate Causes of PAUC Growth Relative 
to the MS B Baseline 
Inception % 
MS B Weight estimate too low  6 
Use of inappropriate escalation rates at MS B  14 
Execution 
Endogenous: Ramp delays to peak production  2 
Endogenous: Lower procurement rate and reduced quantity  3 
Exogenous: Change in fee arrangements below the prime level  3 
Not Classified      
Cost of Redesign  26 
Residual  3 
Total  57 




The redesign (in the context of the F-35’s technical and programmatic complexities) 
clearly is of pivotal importance to any root cause analysis of the program. 
F-35 3: IDA’s Estimate of the Contribution of the 
Redesign to PAUC Growth 
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Redesign 
• Additional SDD design 
effort 
 
• Decreased manufacturing 
efficiency 
 
• More non-recurring tooling 
and equipment 
 
• Affordability initiatives 
dropped 




The redesign (including the procurement stretch and delay) accounted for 31 percentage  
points of the 57% PAUC growth that triggered the FY09 Nunn-McCurdy Breach. 
F-35 4: APUC Growth from 2007 Baseline in 
WSARA Root Cause Categories 
#2 Unrealistic baseline estimate (weight, escalation rates)      20% 
#5 Endogenous: Changes in ramp rates, buy profiles, and quantity 
induced by EMD cost growth and schedule slips 
      5% 
#8 Exogenous: Changes in program content        3%* 
#8 Cost of the redesign      26% 
#8  Residual        3% 
Total change from 2007 Baseline      57% 
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Both studies recognized the importance of the redesign effort. IDA presented an 
estimate of the costs of the redesign, but was unable to make a clear assignment of 
responsibility (in terms of WSARA root causes) for these costs.  The RAND study 
also acknowledged its inability to make firm assignments of root causes. 
* The IDA analysis classifies this as an unrealistic aspect of the baseline cost estimate rather than the cost 
associated with a later decision.  
F-35 5: Causes of the Redesign 






It is arguable that the roots of the problem lie in a misperception of the 
maturity of the program at MS B and the great difficulties of coping with the 
inevitable prospect of weight growth in the context of a program to design 
three aircraft variants (one STOVL) with highly common airframes.  It also is 
necessary to consider the efficiency of the contractor and the role of 
government-directed changes in design requirements. 
Milestone B 







F-35 6: Contractor Influences on the Redesign 
RAND Study (examples) 
• “By focusing on the less complex CTOL system before the more complicated 
difficult STOVL one, Lockheed Martin…” (51)  
• “Lockheed Martin made a substantial number of important design 
decisions….on their own with only informal government participation and 
no contractual record.” (59) 
IDA Study  
• IDA cites other studies that found “poor performance by government or 
contractor personnel responsible for program management”; e.g.: 
– Mission integration and software development not under control, 
– Risk reduction management process and funding not creditable, and 
– Parts shortage and production line workarounds. 
18 May 2012 29 
Neither study tackles the question of the extent to which  
Lockheed Martin decisions contributed to cost growth. 
F-35 6: Conclusions 
• RAND study concludes that “The root cause lies in some 
measure in an overly optimistic baseline estimate of the 
influence of acquisition reform and produceability estimates.” 
 
•  IDA concludes that: “It is clear that, at the most fundamental 
level, Government actions were significantly more important 
in driving the cost growth than contractor execution 
problems.” 
 
• These conclusions are not squarely contradictory. They are 
different, and neither study provides a clear and compelling 
account of the causes of the redesign, which is the largest 
proximate cause of cost growth in the F-35 program. 
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IDA Summary of Conclusions 
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Summary of Conclusions  
      The very short stories of the conclusions reached on the issues considered 
here are: 
– DDG-1000—PAUC breach largely driven by exogenous decrease in 
planned procurement. 
– RMS—Just over 40% of the APUC growth attributable to government 
failure to respond appropriately to tests results on the system’s 
reliability. 
– Global Hawk: About one-quarter of the APUC was a self-inflicted 
wound: a failure to include known content in the cost estimate for  
2007 rebaselined program. 
– ACWA: One root cause is a contract structure that did not incentivize 
either the government or the contractor to realistically estimate and 
control life-cycle costs. The magnitude of cost growth attributable to 
this root cause was not established. 
– F-35: Nearly half of the APUC growth is attributable to the redesign, 
but the root causes of the redesign were not clearly established. 
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RMS PAUC 14% 22% 35% 6% 85% 
Approval of three LRIP lots in the face of test results showing reliability problems. 
Global 
Hawk 
APUC 21.5% 0 13.9%  11.7% 47.1% 
In an evolutionary acquisition, content needed to meet requirements was not 
included in the baseline cost estimate. 
ACWA PAUC 21.9% 10.2% 0 9.5% 41.6% 
Incentive effects of contract terms and structure. 
F-35 PAUC 20% 5% 3% 29% 57% 
Causes of the redesign. 
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Only the one issue for each MDAP as summarized above  is discussed in this brief. 
